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Abstract
Why would a political elite voluntarily dilute its political power by extending the voting franchise? This paper
develops a dynamic recursive framework for studying voter enfranchisement. We specify a class of dynamic
games in which political rights evolve over time. Each period, private decisions of citizens co-mingle with
government policies to act upon a state variable such as a capital stock, a public good, or the likelihood
of an insurrection. Policies are determined by a pivotal decision maker in a potentially restricted franchise.
The pivotal decision maker can also delegate decision authority to a new decision maker in the subsequent
period. We describe conditions under which an equilibrium of this "dictator delegation game" corresponds to
a majority vote decision by the enfranchised group to expand the set of citizens with voting rights. Under
these conditions, each period’s pivotal decision maker is a median voter who can designate authority to a
new median of a larger voting franchise in the next period. We characterize the equilibria by their Euler
equations. In certain games, the equilibria generate paths that display a gradual, sometimes uneven history
of enfranchisement that is roughly consistent with observed patterns of extensions. Our main result shows
that extensions of the franchise occur in a given period if and only if the private decisions of the citizenry
have a net positive spillover to the dynamic payoﬀ o ft h ec u r r e n tm e d i a nv o t e r . T h es i z eo ft h ee x t e n s i o n
depends on the size of the spillover. Since the class of games we study can accommodate a number of proposed
explanations for franchise extension (e.g., the threat of insurrection, or ideological or class conﬂict within the
elite, etc), the result suggests a common causal mechanism for these seemingly diﬀerent explanations. We
describe a number of parametric environments that correspond to the various explanations, and show how the
mechanism works in each.
Keywords: Dynamic games, voter enfranchisement, franchise extension, dictator delegation game
JEL codes: C73, D72, D78.
∗Department of Economics, Georgetown University, Washington DC 20057, USA, wgj@georgetown.edu,
www.georgetown.edu/faculty/wgj .
†Department of Economics, Georgetown University, Washington DC 20057, USA, lagunofr@georgetown.edu,
www.georgetown.edu/lagunoff/lagunoff.htm . Most of the research for this project was completed while the second
author visited Johns Hopkins University and the W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy at the University of
Rochester during the 2002-03 academic year. Their hospitality, and the ﬁnancial support of NSF Grant SES-0108932
are gratefully acknowledged.
‡First draft: July 1, 2003. We thank, without implication, Daron Acemoglu, Jim Jordan, Esteban Klor, Torsten
Persson, Nicola Persico, Kevin Roberts, Eric Rasmusen, Juuso Valimaki, and numerous seminar participants for helpful
comments.
1“There is no more invariable rule in the history of society. The further electoral rights
are extended, the greater the need for extending them; for after each concession, the
strength of the democracy increases, and its demands increase with its strength."
Alexis de Tocqueville1
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Voluntary expansion of political rights by a ruling elite is at ﬁrst glance paradoxical. The elite, after
all, dilutes its power when it extends these rights to others. Yet, signiﬁcant extensions of the voting
franchise took place in Europe throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. Instances of franchise
extensions date back, in fact, much further. The constitutional reforms of Cleisthenes in 508 BC
in Athens was arguably an early form of franchise extension.2 Another early instance occurred in
494 BC, when the patricians in the early Roman Republic conceded the right of the plebs (the
"commoners") to participate in the election of magistrates.
This paper examines the determinants of franchise extension. We have two goals in mind. First,
rather than describing a speciﬁc, stylized model to "explain" the history of voting rights, we propose a
general framework in which competing explanations of franchise extention can be usefully evaluated.
The few existing models tend to diﬀerentiate themselves by whether franchise extensions are modeled
as being driven by external conﬂicts (i.e., the threat of revolution) or whether they result from internal
discord (i.e., political competition between members of the elite). We seek a canonical framework
that can accommodate, as special cases, the essential elements of most existing models and existing
explanations of franchise extension, some of which we review later in Section 2. Second, we seek
a model which produces outcomes that are consistent, broadly speaking, with the observations on
franchise extensions. Though the "data" of enfranchisement are often hard to interpret, we identify
certain tendencies associated with many observed extensions of rights. These observations are also
discussed in Section 2.
To address these goals, we specify a class of dynamic games in which the set of eligible vot-
ers is endogenously determined each period. Political rights evolve as a fully dynamic recursive
phenomenon.
Speciﬁcally, we posit a society of n inﬁnitely lived citizens. Each period, private decisions of
citizens co-mingle with a government policy to determine the value of an economic state variable
in the subsequent period. This economic state, which may be a capital stock, a public good, or
the likelihood of an insurrection, evolves according to a simple non-stochastic transition function
of the previous period’s state, private actions, and the policy decision. The government’s policy
decision may correspond to a tax, a public expenditure, or a public investment. Each citizen’s
private decision may aﬀect others. For example, the decision may be labor eﬀort, or savings, or
voluntary contributions to a public good, or participation in a popular revolt. These decisions spill
over to others’ payoﬀs either directly by entering their preferences or indirectly through changes in
the state. Payoﬀsi nag i v e np e r i o dd e p e n do nt h e s ed e c i s i o n sa n do nt h ec u r r e n ts t a t e .
Initially, the voting franchise is restricted – a subset of the citizens has voting rights. These
voting rights enable the currently enfranchised to choose the current policy and also to possibly
expand voting rights to a larger set of citizens in the subsequent period. Because natural technical
issues arise in obtaining well deﬁned majority winning outcomes under endogenous dynamic game
payoﬀs, we formulate this decision problem as follows. Consider an alternative game in which a
pivotal decision maker – a dictator – from the currently enfranchised group, makes all the public
decisions in the current period. This dictator chooses a current policy and designates a dictator
1Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America,V o l .1 ,c h . 4
2Among other things, these reforms delineated citizenship and allowed for participation in the citizen Assembly. See
Fine, (1983).
1(possibly himself) for the subsequent period. With the possible delegation of decision authority from
one individual to another, a complete description of the state in each period is given by the economic
state variable and the identity of the current dictator (the "political state" variable). An equilibrium
of this dictator delegation game is a state-contingent proﬁle of private actions, public policies, and
delegation decisions that constitutes a Markov Perfect equilibrium.
We show, under certain conditions, that the equilibrium outcomes of this game correspond to
the outcome that would occur if public decisions were determined by a majority-vote. Under these
conditions, the majority outcome of the restricted voting franchise corresponds to the preferred
outcome of the median voter within that franchise. This median voter, in turn, designates a new
median voter of a larger voting franchise in the next period. Consequently, the outcomes correspond
to a new franchise decision by the current franchise each period.
This model exhibits three critical characteristics. First, political rights are explicitly chosen to
solve a strategic delegation problem. Each period’s dictator is a median voter who can eﬀectively
delegate decision authority to a new median in the next period by changing the set of eligible
voters. Because the franchise option is a carefully calibrated instrument in the hands of the currently
enfranchised, universal suﬀrage need not result. A current median may choose to extend the vote to
only a subset of the remaining citizens. We do not rule out the possibility that the franchise could
be contracted in equilibrium, although our examples exhibit franchise extension.
Second, this strategic delegation is recursive. Since no commitment is attributed to a current
franchise extension, an extension of rights is not a once-and-for-all decision. A franchise extension
now does not preclude the future enfranchised group from extending even further later on. In
particular, because future pivotal voters’ extensions are beyond what would be considered ideal from
the point of view of the current pivotal voter, his current choice of extension is dampened below that of
a once-and-for-all decision. This is an implication of the recursive (inﬁnite horizon) formulation that
cannot be captured in, for example, a two period model. The net result is gradualism: extension
may be a slow, tedious process by which elites extend to lessor elites, who proceed eventually to
elites-in-waiting, and so forth.
Third, the franchise is an instrumental rather than fundamental objective for each voter.T h e
model explains little if rights are extended simply because exogenous costs or beneﬁts of the franchise
are inserted directly into preferences or technology. Instead, we assume preferences for greater
enfranchisement are derived from fundamental preferences about its aﬀect on policies and private
decisions of individuals.
We regard these three features as critical to the formulation of a credible theory that can account
for the wide heterogeneity of historical enfranchisement (discussed in more detail in Section 2). There
are other models, which we also review in Section 2, that satisfy one or, possibly, two of these features.
However, we are not aware of other work that satisﬁes all three.
We show that equilibria in this model may exhibit partial, gradual, and possibly uneven franchise
extensions. The unevenness may be due to the particular evolution of the economic state variable, or
it may be due to peculiarities in the distribution of heterogeneous citizens. We provide a characteri-
zation of equilibrium in terms of the associated Euler equations, each corresponding to a participant’s
decision problem. These Euler equations are analogous to those in dynamic politico-economic models
of policy such as the "Generalized Euler equation" approach of Klein, Krusell, and Ríos Rull (2002).
However, Euler equations in the present model contain strategic interaction terms not present in
politico-economic models.
In fact, these extra terms are the key to understanding franchise extension. Our main result
shows that an extension of the franchise occurs in a given period if and only if the private decisions
of the citizenry have a net positive (marginal) spillover to the dynamic payoﬀ of the current median
voter. The size of the extension depends on the size of the spillover.
Among other things, the result implies that in the absence of private decisions of the citizens,
2policies alone cannot cause a pivotal decision maker to relinquish power. Private decisions of the
citizenry represent an implicit policy-relevant externality that the pivotal decision maker does not
control. Because of the dynamic nature of the problem, current "policy-bribes" cannot induce the
appropriate eﬀort from the public since they do not guarantee favorable policies in the future.
The franchise extension, however, does oﬀer a guarantee. A change in voting rights places deci-
sion authority in the hands of a diﬀerent pivotal voter in the future. Hence, a franchise extension
represents a credible commitment to future policies that are closer to those preferred by the disen-
franchised citizens. If this commitment elicits a net positive eﬀort response from other citizens, the
pivotal voter is willing to sacriﬁce his power.
The idea that franchise is a commitment device was also explored in a seminal paper on the
franchise by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). They posit a model in which a ruling elite can choose
whether in any period to make a once-and-for-all, universal extension of voting rights to the rest
of the population. The motive is to pre-empt a threat of uprising or to resolve a hold-up problem.
We refer to this pre-emption motive as the "external conﬂict" explanation. The external conﬂict
explanation contrasts with an "internal conﬂict" explanation, an example of which is a recent paper
by Lizzeri and Persico (2003). According to the "internal conﬂict" explanation, rights are extended
to gain support in an environment with ideological or class conﬂict among the elite.
Section 2 discusses similarities and diﬀerences between our approach and these and other mod-
els of franchise extension. Section 3 describes the basic framework. We show by means of several
examples that the class of dynamic enfranchisement problems posited here is broad enough to ac-
commodate both internal and external conﬂict explanations. The results therefore suggest a common
causal mechanism that underlies both types of rationale. In Section 4 we characterize equilibria that
admit a ﬁrst order characterization, i.e, that satisfy and are fully characterized by interior Euler
equations. The main results are described there. Section 5 ﬁnds explicit analytical solutions in a
number of parameterized environments. These cases illustrate how the model can produce franchise
extension paths that are qualitatively consistent with observed political reforms. Section 6 contains
concluding remarks. Proofs of the main results are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Three Observations and Two Types of Models
Many of the franchise extensions observed throughout history have common characteristics. There
are three qualitative characteristics of observed franchise extensions that the present framework
should confront.
(I) Most extensions are partial extensions. Historically, ruling elites have not had to choose
exclusively between dictatorship and universal suﬀrage. More often, voting rights are oﬀered to
the "adjacent" group in the social hierarchy. Often the restricted franchise was deﬁned by wealth.3
Finer (1997, p. 336) writes of nascent democracy in the Greek city states:
"In the earliest forms of restricted participation, that is, in the oligarchies, a property
qualiﬁcation constituted the basis for full citizenship. Later, in some cities, all sources
of wealth were put on equality with land, and citizens’ rights and duties were gradated
according to one’s riches."
In the 19th century, England partially expanded along lines of wealth or property ownership as
well. However, in Italy, the franchise was granted to citizens who passed certain educational as well
3The term timocracy was introduced by Aristotle to characterize systems restricted in this way ( see
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html ).
3as ﬁnancial criteria in 1849. 19th century Prussia presents an interesting case: in 1849, voting rights
were extended to most citizens, but these rights were accorded proportionately to the percentage of
taxes paid.4 Finally, even today in most countries the franchise is usually restricted in some way.5
(II) Extensions are typically gradual processes, not one shot decisions. England’s
history bears this out. A brief chronology of 19th and early 20th century franchise extensions in the
U.K. indicates a gradual broadening of political rights.6
1830 Voting franchise restricted to some 2% of population
1832 Reform Act extends franchise to 3.5% of population
1867 Second Reform Act extends to some 7.7% of population
1884 Extension to 15% of population
1918 Universal male (over 21) suﬀrage and female (over 30) suﬀrage
1928 Universal suﬀrage (over 21)
Franchise extension in England had, in fact, a longer history whose beginnings predated these
extensions. In a number of other European countries, gradual extensions corresponded to technolog-
ical innovations such as those of the industrial revolution. In ancient Rome, extensions occurred as
the state’s boundaries gradually expanded.
(III) Extensions are often uneven. In many countries, large delays, lasting decades or longer
have occurred between successive extensions. Again, England’s chronology is an example. In the
Netherlands, voting rights were extended in 1857 from 2% to 14% of the population. The next major
expansion occurred in 1894 when rights were extended to all males. In Italy, universal male suﬀrage
in 1912 was preceded by an extension in 1882 (14%) which, in turn, was preceded by the partial
extension in 1849. In the ancient Roman Republic, various extensions not associated with territorial
expansion occurred in 494 BC, 336 BC, and 287 BC.7
Little is known about whether and what types of models can accommodate these three criteria.
There is a sizable informal literature in which a number of rationales for the franchise – including
the ones discussed here – have been proposed. For this we refer the reader to the useful surveys in
Acemoglu and Robinson (AR) (2000) and Lizzeri and Persico (LP) (2003). We concentrate instead
on the much sparser formal modeling that has been done, starting with Acemoglu and Robinson’s
work (2000, 2001), itself.8 The essential claim in Acemoglu and Robinson’s work is that the primary
force behind, at least, the 19th century extensions was the desire by the elite to head oﬀ social
unrest. AR postulate a dynamic game in which the timing of an all-or-nothing franchise extension
is determined by the median voter of a ruling elite. A state variable evolves stochastically which
determines the rate of success of any popular revolt. In the absence of a franchise decision, the
disenfranchised mob, acting as a unitary actor, revolts in certain states of the world, and refrains in
others. Redistribution to the disenfranchised is not a credible deterrent since it will only be used in
4The electorate was divided into three groups, each group given equal weight in the voting. The wealthiest individuals
who accounted for the ﬁrst third of taxes paid accounted for 3.5% of the population. The next wealthiest group – the
"middle class" – accounted for 10-12% of the population. The rest of the population (about 85%) accounted for the
remaining third of the voting power.
5In the U.S., convicted felons cannot typically vote, and, until recently, "on-site" registration in some states eﬀec-
tively limits voting rights of the immobile and the mentally ill.
6Finer (1997), p. 1638.
7In 336 BC, one of the consulships became available for election by plebians. In 287 BC the Hortensian Law was
introduced which gave resolutions in the plebian council the force of law. Again, see Finer (1997).
8We limit our attention to models in which franchise decisions are explicitly endogenous. In particular, we acknowl-
edge but do not discuss a large literature that examines the consequences of the expansion of rights. To name one
example, Husted and Kenny (1997) examine the eﬀect of extensions on the size of government expenditures.
4threatening states of the world. By contrast, an extension of voting rights to the entire population
puts the decision in the hands of the population median who chooses redistribution in all states.
Extensions are then a credible way to buy-oﬀ the populace. Hence, franchise extensions pre-empt
revolutions.
Similar motives for extending the franchise appear in models by Justman and Gradstein (1999)
and Conley and Temimi (2001). They both examine games in which extension of voting rights occurs
because of the potential for the disenfranchised group to impose costs on the elite through rioting,
protest, or some other form of alienation if the franchise is not extended. These costs induce a trade-
oﬀ similar to AR. Expansion entails a loss of decision making power, but it also pre-empts the costly
social unrest.9 In contrast to AR, the Conley and Temimi model is static and so it cannot address
dynamic issues. On the other hand it can address the explicit free rider problems (unlike AR) in
the decision to revolt. The Justman and Gradstein model operates in an overlapping generations
environment and so it can address issues of gradual extension. However, they exogenously assume
(rather than derive, as in AR) costs of disenfranchisement.
These "external conﬂict" models may be contrasted with an alternative "internal conﬂict" story
in which political competition within the elite leads one or another faction to reach out to disen-
franchised citizens. Lizzeri and Persico (2003) formulate a game with elements of this story. They
examine a static, random voter model of Downsian competition between two candidates who vie for
votes among a restricted franchise. The competition creates an ineﬃciency when there are relatively
few eligible voters. A franchise extension, determined by referendum, is shown to lead to a more
eﬃcient electoral process in terms of the allocation of expenditure between public goods and private
transfers.10
In contrast with the aforementioned models, Roberts (1998, 1999) and Barbera, Maschler, and
Shalev (2001) examine long horizon dynamic game models with forward looking decision makers
who can choose the decision maker(s) in the subsequent period. In this respect, our work is closest
to theirs. Both papers examine dynamic games in which a country or an organization can "invite
in" desirable outsiders to join the group from abroad. In Barbera, et al., this decision is made
unilaterally by any member of society. In Roberts, the decision is made by the median voter as
a way to generate endogenous hysteresis in the size of the group. Another innovation of Robert’s
papers is that it derives well deﬁned majority voting outcomes each period in the dynamic game
from single crossing properties on the primitive preferences.11 The main diﬀerences between these
papers and ours are, ﬁrst, that these are essentially models of immigration rather than of franchise
extension (since outsiders are not members of society before they enter), and, second, voters in these
models have exogenous, rather than derived, preferences over the size or composition of the group.
In the subsequent section, we describe a class of dynamic games that can accommodate many
of the key elements of these diverse models. Rather than focusing on one source of conﬂict (exter-
nal threat) or another (internal political competition), or assuming exogenous preferences over the
franchise, the present model derives such conﬂicts and preferences. At the same time, we require a
rich enough class of environments that can produce dynamic paths of franchise extensions roughly
consistent with the aforementioned facts.
3 Dynamic Enfranchisement
In this section we ﬁrst describe a class of dynamic games in which policy decisions are made each
9Though the rationale for extension is slightly diﬀerent, Fleck and Hanssen (2003) examine a simple hold-up problem
between two actors with the same type of trade-oﬀ.
10We discuss the relation between their work and the present paper further in Section 5.3.
11Because the stage game payoﬀs in Robert’s framework depend on group membership directly, these assumptions
cannot be adapted to the present paper.
5period by a dictator, who may then delegate decision authority to another individual, who becomes
the dictator in the subsequent period. We refer to these games as dictator delegation games (DDGs).
We then show that the equilibrium outcomes of these games correspond to the decisions that would
be made in accordance with a simple majority rule in a restricted voting franchise. The delegation of
a dictator corresponds to a decision by the currently enfranchised group to alter the franchise. We
then provide several examples subsumed by the general framework.
3.1 Dictator Delegation Games
There are n citizens in a society, each labeled i =1 ,...,n. Citizens are assumed to diﬀer according
to a taste, productivity, or income parameter. The population of all citizens is denoted N.
Time is discrete: t =0 ,1,2,....A t t i m e t, each individual chooses some action eit that describes
a private decision taken by citizen i at date t.W el e tE denote the set of feasible private decisions
for each citizen, and denote the vector of private decisions by
et =( e1t,...,e nt ).
These decisions may capture any number of activities, including labor eﬀort, savings, or investment
activities. They may also include "non-economic" activities such as religious worship. To simplify
language, we refer to the decision as simply the eﬀort choice.
Also at time t, a policy variable pt, chosen from some feasible set P. For example, p may be a
ﬂat tax rate on income which generates revenue to produce a public good. We assume that policies,
whatever they happen to be, are chosen at date t by a single individual, whom we refer to as a
dictator.L e t , mt ∈ N be the identity of the dictator at time t,w i t hm0 an exogenously given initial
dictator. As well as choosing the policy variable, in any period the current dictator can also choose
the identity of the subsequent period’s dictator. That is, mt chooses mt+1 (not necessarily diﬀerent
from mt). Following the standard practice in modelling dynamic games, the choices of et, pt,a n d
mt+1, are made simultaneously (and non-cooperatively) at time t.
At each date t,e ﬀort and policy choices interact to inﬂuence a physical state variable denoted by
ωt ∈ Ω. In most of the analysis the state is one-dimensional, i.e., Ω ⊂ R. This state may represent
a level of capital stock or a stock of natural resource. Alternatively, it could represent aggregate
wealth or another moment of the distribution of income, or the strength of an overthrow threat.
This physical state ωt is assumed to evolve according to a transition function Q where
ωt+1 = Q(ωt,e t,p t)
and ω0 is given exogenously in order to begin the process. A complete description of the state of
the game at date t is given, then, by (ωt,m t).
The payoﬀ to each individual, i ∈ N, is a time separable function,
∞ X
t=0
δt ui(ωt,e t,p t )
where δ is a common discount factor, and the stage payoﬀ is ui. Note that since a citizen’s private
decision can aﬀect others, his decision may be subject to a "free rider" problem in the sense that
under (or over) provision of ei, relative to some socially optimum benchmark, is likely.
A Dictator Delegation Game (DDG), G, is summarized by the collection
G = h(ui)n
i=1,Q,Ω,E,P,ω0,m 0;Ni
6We study DDGs in which Ω ⊂ IR and both E and P are compact, convex intervals in IR +,a n di n
which for each i, ui and Q are twice continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly, jointly concave in all
variables.
This speciﬁcation makes two key simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that all decisions
are one dimensional. This is clearly made for reasons of tractability. Second, we assume that the
dynamic game is deterministic. This could easily be modiﬁed to allow for shocks and other stochastic
features. In general, one would ordinarily use the language of stochastic games (where Q evolves
according to a Markov kernel). The deterministic assumption is made, not so much for tractability,
but for ease of illustration. The basic ideas are expressed most directly in the deterministic case.
Dictator delegation (and thus franchise extension) is a substitute for credible commitment to
f u t u r ep o l i c y . I nt h es e t - u pw eh a v ed e s c r i b e d ,c o m m i t m e n tt oas e q u e n c eo ff u t u r ep o l i c i e si s
potentially valuable for two reasons. First, since the model is deterministic, commitment to policies
in future periods has the same eﬀect as if the dictator was somehow able to act as a Stakelberg leader
in each future period. Thus commitment to future policies can enable the dictator to aﬀect agents’
future eﬀort choices. Second, by commiting to future policies, the dictator can credibly inﬂuence
the "value" of economic states in those periods (e.g., by promising a low tax rate in the future, it
might increase the value of accrued savings), which can thereby aﬀect agents’ current eﬀort decisions,
since these eﬀorts in part determine future economic states. When commitment to future policies is
not credible, dictator delegation may serve as a useful substitute. Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2000)
paper is a speciﬁc example of this kind of mechanism.
Of course, we do not expect that, by delegating authority to an alternative dictator, the current
dictator will be able to perfectly replicate the outcome he could attain with commitment. This is
for two reasons: ﬁrst, because he cannot instruct his choice of dictator how to choose future policies;
and second, because he cannot stop her from delegating authority further. Nonetheless, the option
of delegating authority may be valuable to the current dictator, and we show that such delegation
can arise in equilibrium. The second factor limiting the dictator’s ability to replicate the ﬁrst best
outcome - inability to stop future dictators subsequently delegating authority to others - leads to
gradual evolution of the franchise in equilibrium. This richer, recursive, feature diﬀerentiates our
model from the once-and-for-all extension assumed in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).
3.2 Dictator Delegation as Enfranchisement
There is a clear relationship between DDGs and the enfranchisement problem. Under limited enfran-
chisement, political rights are restricted to a subset of the population Mt ⊆ N, whose preferences are
aggregated through some political process (e.g., a voting mechanism).12 By their vote, these citizens
have the right to choose current policies. However, they can also choose to extend these rights to
others in the future. This may be done for a number of reasons, some of which were outlined in
the Introduction. Each period, therefore, a currently enfranchised group can choose, along with the
policy pt, a group next period that will have the same rights in period t +1 .S p e c i ﬁcally, citizens in
Mt can choose to enfranchise a group Mt+1 next period.
In DDGs the preferences of a single individual, whom we call the dictator, determine policy
outcomes. However, this attribute is true of any pivotal decision making process. In particular, a
pivotal decision maker may be, under certain conditions, the median voter arising from a political
process in which political rights are voting rights. If mt is the dictator in a DDG, then ordering
the enfranchised citizenry such that Mt = {1,2,...,2mt − 1}, mt is also the median index in the
enfranchised group, Mt.
If the aggregation procedure were to reﬂect the preferences of a median voter in a well-deﬁned
12We do not model how these rights are enforced or preserved. Of course, the state variable could capture some the
technology for of preserving these restricted rights.
7sense, then it would be natural to think of the current period’s median voter as choosing both
current policy, and, by her choice of Mt+1 ≡{1,2,...,2mt+1 − 1}, the identity of the next period’s
median voter, mt+1.13 Indeed, since each period’s median voter (if well-deﬁned) is pivotal, we might
reasonably expect her choices of curent policy and future median to coincide with the policy and
delegation choices she would have made if she had been the dictator in the corresponding DDG.
The problem that we face, of course, is to ensure that such a median voter exists in each period
and is well-deﬁned. In what follows we establish conditions under which this is the case. In the
examples below, we refer to the pivotal decision maker, which covers both the dictator in a DDG,
and a median voter when one exists.
3.3 Examples
In this Section, we show that the class of Dictator Delegation Games (which as discussed above, can
be interpreted as franchise extension problems) is broad enough to cover a large number of interesting
political/policy examples including environments in which internal or external conﬂicts exist.
3.3.1 Internal Conﬂicts over Public Goods
This example captures elements of the "internal conﬂict" explanation of franchise extension.14 Tax
revenue is again used to invest in an asset, but now it yields a public consumption good. Each
citizen holds wealth in the form of land. The land endowment, yi,o fc i t i z e ni is exogenous, and it
does not vary over time. Aggregate income is Y =
P
i yi. The policy pt in period t is a ﬂat tax
on land, yielding revenue ptY . Aggregate individual eﬀort,
P
i eit, instead of augmenting personal





where ωt+1 is the public good produced next period. Finally, citizen i cares about after-tax wealth,
about leisure, and about the public good. His payoﬀ in period t is
ui(ωt,e t,p t)=u(yi(1 − pt),e it,α iωt)
Here, citizens in the population could diﬀer in at least two ways. First, they could diﬀer according
to a taste parameter αi ∈ [0,1]. Citizens with higher values of α may place higher value of on
public good. Examples of this type of conﬂict include views on of state-supported religion, or the
support of certain social policies, such as opposition to scientiﬁc theories of evolution, the promotion
of liberal attitudes towards race and sexual preference issues, and the enactment and enforcement
of anti-abortion laws. One would expect in this case that preferred tax rates will diﬀer across the
population. We refer to cases of taste heterogeneity such as this as cases of ideological conﬂict.
Second, citizens may diﬀe ri nt h ea m o u n to fl a n dw e a l t h ,yi, they have. We refer to cases of
income or wealth heterogeneity as cases of class conﬂict.C l a s s c o n ﬂict of this type is common in
public economics, and can be shown to induce diﬀerences in voting behavior regarding redistribution,
public goods, and tax policies generally.
13Here we ignore integer problems by framing the problem as if |Mt| were always odd. Note also that we restrict the
analysis to (weak) franchise extensions although, in principle, franchise contraction could be permitted.
14However, the speciﬁcs here are very diﬀerent from the "internal conﬂict" explanation in Lizzeri and Persico (LP)
(2003). We discuss the diﬀerences between LP and the present work at some length in Section 5.3.
83.3.2 The Threat of Insurrection
According to the "external conﬂict" explanation, franchise expansion occurs to head oﬀ the threat
of revolution, uprising, or insurrection. Implicitly, such threats arise from the non-satisfaction of
the preferences of the disenfranchised by the policies chosen by the elite,15 and franchise extension
may be an eﬀective means of reducing the incentives of agents to engage in uprising.
In this example, a class conﬂict coupled with the threat of insurrection is the driving force
behind a franchise extension. This example is constructed deliberately to be close in certain respects
to Acemoglu’s and Robinson’s model of "threat of revolt" as an explanation for the 19th century
extensions.
To simplify things there are two distinct groups, referred to concretely as the nobility (Group
A) and the peasantry (Group B), respectively. There are J such peasants, and n − J noblemen.
The franchise belongs to a subset of the nobility. A nobleman with index i has a quantity of land
yi where, as before, yi is constant across time. Each period, a unit of land generates a unit of a
consumption good, so that yi acres generate yi units of potential consumption. By contrast, peasants
are completely disenfranchised and possess no land.
Each period t, there is a possibility that the peasants may successfully revolt and conﬁscate the
nobility’s aggregate return, Y ≡
P
i∈A yi from land. Each peasant j =1 ,...,J,c o n t r i b u t e sejt
toward this eﬀort, while each nobleman i = J +1,...,ncontributes eﬀort eit toward suppressing the
revolt. As before, eﬀort is costly to all citizens.
Let EAt =
P
i∈A eit and EBt =
P
j∈B ejt denote the aggregate eﬀort by nobility and peasantry,
respectively, in period t. The state variable, ωt, is the probability in period t that the conﬁscation
by the peasants is unsuccessful. Formally,
ωt+1 = f(EAt,E Bt,ωt)
so that the success likelihood depends on the aggregate eﬀort of each group, presumably increasing
in EAt (less likely conﬁscation) and decreasing in EBt (more likely conﬁscation).
If a conﬁscation is successful, then the entire return Y is expropriated by the peasantry who split
it evenly. On the other hand, if the revolt is unsuccessful, then peasants receive a redistributive
subsidy chosen by the pivotal decision maker in the restricted franchise before the state revolt’s
success is known. Roughly, the idea is that redistribution is used to "buy oﬀ"t h ep e a s a n t sb y
inducing them to reduce their eﬀort toward the uprising.
Each period t, the pivotal nobleman chooses a redistributive tax rate pt which produces revenue
ptY . However, the technology for redistribution is concave – implying that some of the revenue
is potentially lost in the redistributive process. Formally, revenue ptY produces g(ptY ) available
to be equally distributed to all members of society if there is no conﬁscation, where g is a concave
function.
All citizens have von Neumann Morganstern utility u deﬁned on consumption and eﬀort. Members
of the nobility have expected utility in period t of
uit = ωt u((1 − pt)yi + g(ptY )/n, eit )+ ( 1 − ωt)u(0,e it)
15One motivation for rebellion that we do not consider is the simple desire to be part of the decision-making process,
independent of whether existing decisions are in accordance with a disenfranchised individual’s preferences. That is,
there is no explicit utility gained from "having the vote".
9while members of the peasantry have utility
ujt = ωt u(g(ptY )/n, ejt)+( 1 − ωt) u(Y/J, ejt)
To summarize, individuals in the nobility diﬀer by income, and the policy instrument is a re-
distributive tax. Individuals can either be supportive of the current policy or they can undermine
it. Their current eﬀorts determine the likelihood that the currently enfranchised group remains in
power.
3.4 Equilibria of Dictator Delegation Games
Fix a dictator delegation game G. We assume that all citizens condition their behavior only on payoﬀ
relevant information. The payoﬀ relevant state at time t is a pair (ωt,m t). Here, ωt is interpreted
as the "economic" state while mt represents the "political" state. Strategies that condition only
on the state are commonly referred to as Markov strategies. A Markov strategy proﬁle is a triple
Π ≡ (σ,ψ,µ) where
σ =( σ1,...,σn)
and σi : Ω × N → E for each i. Here, σi(ωt,m t)=eit is the action taken by citizen i when the
physical state is ωt and the current dictator is mt in period t. Analogously, ψ : Ω × N → P where
ψ(ωt,m t)=pt is the policy chosen by the current dictator mt when the physical state is ωt in period
t. Finally, µ : Ω × N → N where µ(ωt,m t)=mt+1 is next period’s dictator chosen by the current
dictator mt when the physical state is ωt.
To summarize, σ is a proﬁle of individual behavioral rules of the citizenry; ψ is the policy rule;
µ is the delegation rule. The last two are determined by the dictator in each period.
The payoﬀs to each individual i of a Markov strategy proﬁle, Π =( σ,ψ,µ) in state (ωt,m t) can
be expressed recursively as
Vi(ωt,m t; Π ) ≡ ui(ωt,σ(ωt,m t),ψ(ωt,m t))+δV i(ωt+1,m t+1; Π ) (1)
where
ωt+1 = Q(ωt,σ(ωt,m t),ψ(ωt,m t)) (2)
and
mt+1 = µ(ωt,m t) (3)
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium of a DDG is a Markov proﬁle, Π =( σ,ψ,µ), consisting of state
contingent eﬀorts, policies, and delegation choices such that at each date t =0 ,1,2,..., the following
hold.
(i) Optimal eﬀort decisions: For any state (ωt,m t),e a c hi,a n de a c hˆ σi,a n d
Vi(ωt,m t; Π ) ≥ Vi(ωt,m t;ˆ σi,σ−i,ψ,µ)
10(ii) Optimal policy and delegation decisions: For any state (ωt,m t) and for any ˆ emt, ˆ pt,a n d
ˆ mt+1,
Vmt(ωt,m t; Π ) ≥ umt(ωt,σ−mt(ωt,m t), ˆ emt, ˆ pt)+δV mt(ˆ ωt+1, ˆ mt+1; Π )
where ˆ ωt+1 = Q(ωt,σ−mt(ωt,m t), ˆ emt, ˆ p).
It can be readily veriﬁed that an equilibrium of a DDG is a Markov Perfect equilibrium. Each
citizen chooses his own eﬀort optimally given the state and his (correct) forecast of others’ eﬀort
rules and the policy/delegation rules. The dictator chooses policy, eﬀort, and the identity of next
period’s dictator optimally given the state and his (correct) forecast of the eﬀort rules of the rest
of the citizenry. The question of general existence of equilibria is taken up in a companion paper
(Lagunoﬀ (2003) ). In the present paper, we construct equilibria in a number of parametric examples
in Section 5.
Let Π =( σ,ψ,µ) be an equilibrium of a dictator delegation game, G.L e t {m∗
t} be the identities
of the dictators along the equilibrium path, and let {ω∗
t} be the equilibrium path of economic states.
Finally, deﬁne
Wi(pt,m t+1;ωt,m t,Π)=ui(ωt,σ(ωt,m t),p t)+δV i(ωt+1,m t+1; Π ) (4)
where ωt+1 = Q(ωt,σ(ωt,m t),p t), is individual i’s payoﬀ starting at date t when all players follow
the strategies deﬁned by Π, except that the dictator in period t chooses an arbitrary policy and
extension rule (pt,m t+1).
Deﬁnition 2 Given an ordering of the citizens (without loss of generality, i =1 ,...,n), a strategy









t −1 ≤ n. In other words, there does not exist another (b pt, b mt+1) that defeats (pt,m t+1) in
a strict majority vote in M∗
t when voter preferences are given by Wi(·,·;ω∗
t,m ∗
t,Π).
Notice that the deﬁnition requires only that states along the equilibrium path produce pivotal
decision makers that arise from a majority vote. The interpretation is as follows: each period an
enfranchised groups votes to alter the voting institution used in the future. One option among
many is to expand the franchise to Mt+1 in such a way as to produce a new median voter mt+1
next period. The strategy proﬁle Π is rationalized precisely when this occurs. Our next task is to
establish conditions under which equilibria of DDGs are rationalized by franchise extension - that is,
conditions under which a median voter exists. To this end, we make the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3 (Order Restrictedness) Fix a strategy proﬁle Π and current state (ω,m).L e t W =
(W1,...,W n) be a proﬁle of voter preferences deﬁned in (4), and just write Wi(pt,m t+1) (suppressing
the notational dependence of Wi on Π and (ω,m)). A proﬁle W satisﬁes Order Restrictedness if
t h e r ee x i s t sa no r d e r i n go fN (without loss of generality, i =1 ,...,n), such that for any two pairs
(p,m0) and (b p, b m0),f o re a c hi for which
Wi(p,m0) − Wi(b p, b m0) > 0, (5)
i ti st h ec a s et h a te i t h e r
Wj(p,m0) − Wj(b p, b m0) > 0 ∀ j>i (6)
or
Wj(p,m0) − Wj(b p, b m0) > 0 ∀ j<i . (7)
11This deﬁnition is due to Rothstein (1990), and is related to the single crossing property of Gans
and Smart (1996).16
Lemma 1 (Median Voter Theorem) Let M be a set of voters. Suppose (Wi)i∈M satisﬁes Order
Restrictedness, and let m be the identity of the individual with the median index in M.L e t (pm,m 0
m)
denote individual m’s most preferred voting outcome. Then (pm,m 0
m) is a Condorcet winner.
This Lemma is an immediate consequence of a result by Rothstein (1990), in which the Order
Restrictedness property on voter preferences implies existence of a Condorcet Winner that coincides
with the individual with the median index, m.17. The lemma allows us to infer that if Order
Restrictedness holds at each state along an equilibrium path, then the equilibrium is rationalized by
franchise extension.
The following result shows that when individuals have stage game payoﬀs that admit an Inter-
mediate Preference representation in sense of Grandmont (1978), then DDEs are rationalized by
franchise extension.
Proposition 1 Suppose that in a DDG, stage game preferences can be expressed as
ui(ω,e,p)=h(ω,e,p)f(i)+g(ω,e,p) (8)
where f is monotone. Then any equilibrium Π =( σ,ψ,µ) is rationalized by franchise extension at
date t if 2m∗
t−1 ≤ n .
Proof. If, for a given state (ω,m) and strategy proﬁle Π,f o re a c hi, Wi(p,m0;ω,m,Π) admits the
following of Intermediate Preference representation,
Wi(p,m0;ω,m,Π)=H(p,m0;ω,m,Π)F(i)+G(p,m0;ω,m,Π)
for some monotone function F, then it can be readily veriﬁed that W satisﬁes the Order Restricted-
ness, and Lemma 1 applies. Suppose then that the stage game utility function ui satisﬁes (8). We
now show that given a strategy proﬁle Π =( σ,ψ,µ), i’s dynamic preferences exhibits this decompo-
16Order Restrictedness allows us to prove a median voter theorem when the objects over which voters vote are
fundamentally multi-dimensional, as is the case here (because voters choose the policy p and the franchise extension
m
0). In Gans and Smart, although the choice space can be multi-dimensional, it is necessary that there be a strict
ordering on that space. We place no such restriction on the space of policy and franchise decisions.
17See also Roberts (1977) and Gans and Smart (1996) for related theorems.
12sition. At time t,
Wi(pt,m t+1;ωt,m t,Π)
= ui(ωt,σ(ωt,m t),p t)+δVi(ωt+1,m t+1;Π)






















≡ H(pt,m t+1;ωt,m t,Π)F(i)+G(pt,m t+1;ωt,m t,Π)
where F(i) ≡ f(i). This gives the desired result.
The class of Intermediate preferences is restrictive, although more general conditions under which
Order Restrictedness is satisﬁed are scarce. On the other hand, in all the parametric environments
we study later the preferences satisfy this condition. This means that one need not check explicitly
in each state whether a Condorcet winner exists.
3.5 Finite Agents versus the Continuum
We ﬁnd it necessary to make two further assumptions which deserve comment. First, it will prove
more tractable to treat the voter type as chosen from a continuum rather than from a discrete set
M.S p e c i ﬁcally, let N ⊂ [0,1].I f t h e ﬁnite set of voters is suﬃciently and uniformly dense in the
continuum, then the resulting franchise choices constitute an approximation of the actual equilibrium,
and outcomes of the DDG game with the continuum are only approximately rationalized by majority
voting.
An alternative modeling strategy might have posited a continuum of voters from the beginning.
However, the continuum presents a problem. In much of the history of voter enfranchisement, the
eﬀort choices of citizens correspond to voluntary decisions in a collective action problem such as
volunteering to take part in a protest or public insurrection. But with the continuum, free rider
problems in these decisions are extreme. An individual in a continuum would never choose to riot
or threaten the status quo, or alternatively, to defend the status quo. The ﬁnite agent assumption is
therefore critical to prevent the unreasonable boundary solution ei =0in eﬀort choices of citizens.
Indeed, we later show that for franchise extension to exist, these boundary solutions must not occur.
To sum up, franchise choices are characterized in the next sections as if the current median could
choose the subsequent median from a continuum of types, but in the citizens’ private decisions, the
ﬁnite agent assumption is taken literally.
Second, though we treat the indices m as choice variables for voters, the Markov strategies are
actually functions of the types of players, rather than their identities. For example, in the class
conﬂict examples, individuals are ordered by wealth, y1 ≥ y2 ≥ ···≥ yn. In that case, the strategy
σi(ω,m) is just notational shorthand for σi(ω,ym). 18
18Of course, it must be assumed that citizens are suﬃciently dense in the type space to justify the assumption that
wealth is a continuous variable. Also, if types are not uniformly distributed, then there will be diﬀerences between
134 First Order Characterization
We ﬁrst characterize necessary conditions for an equilibrium assuming diﬀerentiability of the value
function. Later we establish conditions under which diﬀerentiability holds. In all that follows, we
d r o pt h et i m en o t a t i o n ,t, and adopt the usual convention in which primes, e.g., ω0, are used to
denote variables in the subsequent period t +1 , and double primes, e.g., ω00,u s e dt od e n o t et h e
variable two periods ahead t +2 .
Let Π =( σ,ψ,µ) be an equilibrium of the dictator delegation game. Consider, ﬁrst, a citizen’s
eﬀort decision. One can write the recursive payoﬀ evaluated at an equilibrium as the functional
equation:
Vi(ω,m; Π )=m a x
ei
£
ui(ω,ei,σ−i(ω,m),ψ(ω,m)) + δV i(ω0,µ(ω,m); Π )
¤
(9)










As for the pivotal decision maker’s problem, recall that he makes two choices. He chooses a
policy in the current period given the state ω. He also chooses next period’s pivotal decision maker
by making a franchise decision in the current period. That is, a pivotal decision maker with index
m chooses next period’s pivotal decision maker, m0. The functional equation resulting from the dual
choice of policy and franchise is
Vm(ω,m; Π )= m a x
em,p,m0
£
um(ω,em,σ−m(ω,m),p)+δV m(ω0,m 0; Π )
¤
subject to ω0 = Q(ω,em,σ−m(ω,m),p). Derived from this value function, the interior Euler equation













Deﬁnition 4 We will say that an equilibrium, Π =( σ,ψ,µ),a d m i t s a ﬁrst order characterization
if for each citizen i a n de a c hv o t e rm, in every state (ω,m),( i ) t h e p r o ﬁle Π =( σ,ψ,µ) satisﬁes
the Equations (10), (11), and (12); (ii) the expression in (10) is strictly decreasing in ei; and (iii)
if the matrix of second derivatives of the system formed by (the left-hand sides of) (10), (11), and
(12) is negative semi-deﬁnite.
the type contingent strategy, σi(ω,ym), and the strategy σi(ω,m) that merely keeps track of player index. In order
to examine these explicit distributional considerations, we will use the "type" notation explicitly when parametric
examples are examined.
14Any equilibrium that admits a ﬁrst order characterization is fully characterized by its Euler
equations. Among them, Equation (12), is the most relevant for understanding franchise expansion.
E x p r e s s e di nt e r m so fau s e f u ld e c o m p o s i t i o no fm a r g i n a le ﬀects, Equation (12) is given by,
∂Vm
∂m0 =
eﬀect of m0 on future policy



































Clearly, a voter m chooses to expand the current franchise only if (13) is satisﬁed at values
µ(ω,m) >m . The decomposition illustrates the various marginal eﬀects that a change in the future
pivotal voter has on the payoﬀ of the current pivotal voter. This means that the current pivotal
voter, m, rationally anticipates his choice of m0 on future eﬀort choices of the citizenry, and future
policies and franchise decisions of subsequent median voters (including himself, should he choose to
retain political power). Among other things, the current median realizes that his choice of franchise
expansion may not be the end of the process. Since next period’s pivotal voter, m0, also satisﬁes
his Euler equations, (11) and (12), if the current pivotal decision maker, m, extends the franchise to
m0 >m , then Order Restrictedness implies
eﬀect of m0 on future policy















∂m0 ≤ 0 (14)
A franchise extension, therefore, implies that the marginal payoﬀ from other citizens’ eﬀort
responses to the extension be nonnegative, i.e.,















∂m0 ≥ 0 (15)
Hence, an optimal enfranchisement for voter m balances the positive marginal eﬀect from future
eﬀort choices (15) from the citizenry with the negative marginal eﬀect of putting future policy and
franchise decisions in the hand of other agents (14). This is illustrated by the two solid lines in
Figure 1. If the current median voter is m, retaining the franchise results in no loss of control -
that is, a zero marginal cost. On the other hand, extending the franchise to a median b m0 generates
maximal beneﬁts associated with eﬀort inducement, but imposes large costs in terms of future policy
and franchise decisions. The index m0 balances these two eﬀects. In fact, the logic can be extended

















Figure 1: Optimal enfranchisement equates marginal beneﬁts from preferable eﬀort decisions with
marginal costs of future policy and franchise distortions
Proposition 2 In any equilibrium that admits a ﬁrst order characterization, the franchise is ex-



















∂m0 > 0 (16)
holds at m = m0.
Though the result is a straightforward application of the Envelope Theorem, we include the
complete proof in the Appendix. Roughly, the idea is that franchise extension requires the spillover
of eﬀort choices of ordinary citizens, without which a current policy maker would preserve his own
power to make future policy decisions into perpetuity. This is true regardless of whether the eﬀort
choices are directed toward investment in public goods or whether the investment is in political
upheaval.
This last point is worth emphasizing. Speciﬁcally, the same causal mechanism underlies both
the so-called “internal conﬂict" and “external conﬂict" explanations for franchise extension.I nt h e
internal conﬂict story, disagreements within the elite over public goods create a motive by some to
extend voting rights to “sympathetic outsiders." The eﬀort choice is, for instance, a private input
needed to produce the controversial good. In the external conﬂict story, the threat of uprising or
insurrection creates a “buy oﬀ" motive for expansion of rights. The eﬀort choice, in that case, is
16one’s contribution either to the cause of overturning or to the cause of defending the current regime.
In either case, the franchise is extended if and only if the aggregate eﬀect of these spillovers are
positive. Presumably, the larger the spillover eﬀect, the larger is the extension.
In the presence of spillovers, a franchise extension can accomplish what a policy change cannot.
Namely, the franchise extension is a credible commitment to future policy changes. The pivotal voter
cannot credibly use current policy instruments to change future behavior except through (blunt)
changes in the physical state. Since current policy changes do not imply future policy changes,
citizens with preferences that diﬀer widely from those of the pivotal voter expect the same median
voter to continue to adopt poor policy choices in the future from their point of view.
By contrast, an extension delegates authority to a diﬀerent pivotal voter tomorrow. This guar-
antees that future policies in subsequent periods are closer to those that the current median voter
would like to be able to commit to. Since this elicits a positive spillover in their eﬀort choices, the
pivotal voter today is willing to sacriﬁce his power. In this sense, the role of franchise extension
is a familiar one in time-consistent models of policy. Extensions are credible since they delegate
policy-making authority to a median whose tastes are closer to the large group of citizens.
Notice, however, that while the enfranchisement option may improve things, it is not generally
a perfect substitute for the optimal, time inconsistent policy sequence. Given the recursive envi-
ronment, the initial voter cannot limit future franchise extensions. A future median may delegate
beyond the point at which the ﬁrst median would choose if the ﬁrst median could make a once-and-
for-all franchise decision. In turn, this possibility distorts the current decision. To see this, consider
an optimal once-and-for-all extension. A once-and-for-all extension trades oﬀ the marginal beneﬁts
of extra eﬀort against the marginal costs of future policy changes (the dashed curve) as illustrated in
Figure 1. Since these costs do not include the costs of future extensions, the new median is m0 >m 0.
Since m0 >m 0 in Figure 1, the current median limits the extension of the franchise below that of a
once-and-for-all decision.
An immediate corollary of the Proposition is: absent spillovers in private decisions, the level of
voter enfranchisement remains ﬁxed. This statement has predictive content. Consider an example of
a policy that subsidizes a particular "state religion." Current subsidies determine, say, the subsequent
available stock of churches. Suppose Citizen i’s church attendance does not aﬀect others’ payoﬀs,
and it does not aﬀect the technology for building churches. In this case, the current median voter will
not delegate authority to another. Though conﬂicts over state-funded religion may, in fact, create
serious social conﬂict, it would not then lead to broader political rights.
Proposition 1 provides a relatively simple way to check if an expansion of the franchise occurs
in equilibrium. To make full use of it, however, requires practical use of all the Euler equations,
since the Inequality (16) depends on knowing both values of the equilibrium strategies, and their
curvature. Consequently, the Euler equations (10)-(12) require a reformulation that depends, to the
extent possible, only on the "primitives" of the problem.
Proposition 3 Let Π =( σ,ψ,µ) denote a proﬁle of continuously diﬀerentiable Markov strategies
such that in every state (ω,m), the values σ(ω,m), ψ(ω,m),a n dµ(ω,m) lie in the interior of their
respective strategy sets. Then Π is an equilibrium that admits a ﬁrst order characterization if and
only if it satisﬁes the following.
I. In every state (ω,m),t h ep r o ﬁle Π =( σ,ψ,µ) satisﬁes:







































































































=0 , ∀i ∈ N (E-3)
II. The expression G3
i for each i is strictly decreasing in ei.
III. The matrix of second derivatives of the system formed by (G1
m,G 2
m,G 3
m) is negative semi-
deﬁnite.
IV. For all i ,if G1
idp +G2
idm0 > 0 ,t h e ne i t h e rG1
jdp +G2
jdm0 > 0 for all j>ior G1
jdp +G2
jdm0 >
0 either for all j<ior for all j>i .
Property IV above is a slightly more restrictive version of the Order Restrictedness condition
adapted to the diﬀerentiable case. The Euler equations (E-1), (E-2), and (E-3) are reformulated
from the original Euler equations (11), (12), and (10), respectively, in order to eliminate their func-
tional dependence on the value functions. What remains is a collection of n partial diﬀerential
equations in the strategy proﬁle Π. Klein, Krusell, and Ríos Rull (KKR) (2002) examine proper-
ties of similar "Envelope-adjusted" Euler equations in recursively competitive equilibrium models of
policy. They refer to these equations as Generalized Euler Equations. As in their reformulation, the
Euler equations above diﬀer substantially from those of single agent, dynamic programming prob-
lems. Unlike in dynamic programming problems, these Euler equations depend on one’s equilibrium
decision rules in the future, and on others’ equilibrium decision rules in the present and in the future.
Hence, they cannot be reduced to pure expressions of primitives as is typical of Euler equations in
DP problems.19 Despite their apparent complexity, the primary virtue of Properties I-IV is that
they provide a computationally tractable characterization of equilibria. We make further use of these
properties in examples below.
19Moreover, the politico-economic and policy models used by KKR and others in the literature are not, strictly
speaking, dynamic games since individual behavior is ﬁltered out in those models by the competitive price mechanism.
Even without a franchise decision, the Euler equations in the present paper contain a number of extra terms not found
in the competitive, "hybrid" models. A related, though simpler (no policy or franchise decisions), version of the Euler
equations in (I) also shows up in Basar and Olsder (1995, Theorem 6.5).
185 Parametric Environments
In this section we examine a series of parametric cases. These cases illustrate how the ﬁrst order char-
acterization may be used to understand enfranchisement. They also illustrate how enfranchisement
may exhibit many of the qualitative features outlined in Section 2. Equilibria that are stationary
in the economic state, ω, exist in each of these environments. This means ∂ψ/∂ω =0 , ∂σ/∂ω =0 ,
and ∂µ/∂ω =0 . Consequently, instead of the Euler Equation, (E-3), in Proposition 3, the Euler



















Finally, all the parametric examples utilize stage game payoﬀs that exhibit Intermediate preference
representations. Our prior results therefore imply that the equilibria are all rationalized by franchise
extension.
5.1 Internal Class Conﬂict Generates Franchise Extension
Recall the example in Section 3.3.1 of a class conﬂict over a public good. yi is each individual’s
exogenous land endowment (measured in terms of the ﬂow of income). Citizens diﬀer in their
endowments. Speciﬁcally, the citizens are ordered so that y1 ≥ y2 ≥ ···yn > 0. Citizen 1 is the
wealthiest while Citizen n is the poorest.20 The aggregate endowment is Y =
P
i yi. For simplicity,
assume that the population median wealth, ¯ y, is less than the wealth of the initial pivotal voter m0,
that is, ym0 > ¯ y. This means the initial franchise is restricted to individuals who are relatively
wealthy. Notice that if ym0 <y 1, then internal class conﬂict exists within the enfranchised elite.
Citizens with wealth levels on the outer fringe of the elite may have more in common with their
neighbors just below them in the income strata than with other members of the elite.
A ﬂat tax rate p on land is chosen by the median enfranchised voter, the revenue from which
ﬁnances investment in a public good, ω. The public good fully depreciates each period, and current
tax revenues fund next period’s public good. Citizens’ privately chosen eﬀorts, ei,a u g m e n tt h e
productivity of resources devoted to provision of the public good. In particular, the transition law
for the public good is
ω0 =( pY )θE
where E =
P
i ei is aggregate eﬀort.
Payoﬀse a c hp e r i o da r eg i v e nb y
ui(ω,e,p)=yi(1 − p)+ω − ce2
i
All citizens value the public good the same way, but income heterogeneity induces diﬀerences in
the way that rich or poor citizens view a tax increase. Since preferences are separable, decision rules
do not vary with the current level of the public good. The ﬁrst order condition gives an individual’s
20We have "reversed" the ordering so that higher indices correspond to lower wealth classes. This maintains consis-
tency with the earlier notation in which extension proceeds to citizens with higher indices.





As before, the eﬀort and policy rules can be expressed as direct functions of an individual’s type, in












1−2θ is a positive constant.21 Eﬀort levels do not vary with one’s own land
wealth, but policy preferences do. If θ<1/2, then preferred tax rates decrease in one’s own wealth.
Wealthier individuals prefer lower taxes. Substituting the policy rule into the eﬀort choices, we derive








where K = δY θ
2c Cθ, another positive constant. Optimal eﬀorts depend only on the identity of the
median voter. According to σ,e ﬀort choices are decreasing in the wealth of the median voter –
wealthier voters indirectly induce lower eﬀort. Since one’s eﬀort contributes public capital to the
creation of the public good, franchise extension is a mechanism by which a current decision maker
can, by delegating his authority, change the level of public capital.
Now observe that
∂σj
∂ym < 0 whenever
∂σj
∂m > 0 since ym is ordered from highest wealth type
to lowest. A franchise extension therefore requires a movement of the median evaluation toward
lower, rather than higher, land endowment, ym. This means that the inequality in Proposition 2
is reversed, using yi as an individual’s type. Hence, from Proposition 2, the equilibrium admits a






Therefore, diﬀerentiating the behavioral rule σ with respect to the state ym, we see that (19) holds
iﬀ θ<1/2. Hence, if θ<1/2,t h e nµ(y) <y , for all y, meaning that the franchise is extended
to successively lower classes in the income strata. Each extension elicits a higher eﬀort from the
citizens. Extension also produces a higher tax rate since taxes and eﬀort are complementary inputs
in the production of public goods.
We now turn to the issue of derivation of an equilibrium franchise rule. Formally, the current
median delegates to a voter with the land endowment ym0, which is chosen to satisfy the Euler
equation ∂Vm
∂ym0 =0 . Expanding this equation gives
21We write ψ(ym) instead of ψ(ω,m) as in earlier sections of the paper because (i) the policy choice is independent
of the economic state ω , and (ii) the optimal policy depends on the median’s income, not his/her index. We could,
of course, have written ψ(ω,m) ≡ e ψ(y(m)),w h e r ey(m)=ym,b u tw eh o p et h ec o n v e n i e n c eo ft h en o t a t i o nw ea d o p t

































































































































































The ﬁrst equality in (20) follows by deﬁnition of the Euler equation (13). The second and third
equalities are just algebra. The ﬁnal equality is the ﬁrst order condition. By iterating forward (20),































We now verify a "guess" that there exists an equilibrium franchise rule which is linear. Speciﬁcally,

























Note that Equation (22) no longer depends on the wealth, ym, of the decision maker. Hence, Equation
(22) is an equation in one unknown, namely µ, the proposed coeﬃcient of a linear franchise rule.
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As long as δ<µ
2θ
1−2θ (and therefore, δ<µ
1

















Hence, any µ ∈ (0,1) which solves (23) and satisﬁes δ<µ
2θ
1−2θ,i st h ec o e ﬃcient in a linear,
equilibrium franchise rule. That is, if µ solves (23), then an equilibrium enfranchisement rule is
given by ym0 = µym. Since the rule is linear, extensions occur until universal suﬀrage is attained.
The linear rule is illustrated in Figure 2.
5.2 Internal Ideological Conﬂict Generates Partial Franchise Extension
This environment is similar to that of the previous example, except that instead of wealth hetero-
geneity, citizens diﬀer in ideological views toward a public good. Land holdings are now identical for
all citizens, but valuations of the public good diﬀer. Indeed, some citizens may place a negative value
22on the public good. Thus, there are two groups who have fundamentally conﬂicting views toward
the good, with diﬀering preference intensities within each group. We use this case to compare the
"internal" mechanism for extension with that of Lizzeri and Persico (2003), who also model this type
of situation.
Tax revenue is used to provide the public good, but the production is augmented (reduced) by
individual contributions of positive (negative) eﬀort. Worldly examples of this type of conﬂict are
g i v e ni nS e c t i o n3 .
Formally, preferences are given by
ui(ω,e,p)=y(1 − p) − ce2
i + αiω
where land holdings, y, are the same across all citizens. However αi, which is a citizen’s utility
weight on the public good, can vary across individuals. We order the weights so that α1 ≥ α2 ≥
···αJ > 0 >α J+1 ≥ ···≥ αn.C i t i z e n sf o rw h o mαi > 0 support the provision of the public good,
while others suﬀer a utility loss from it. Assume that
P
i αi > 0 so that, on balance, positive feeling
toward the good is more intense than negative feeling toward it. Assume also that αm0 > 0 so that
political power initially rests with the “positives." For simplicity, assume that the population median
i s0s ot h a tαm0 > 0 represents a restricted franchise. Since these individuals may disagree about
intensity of preference even if they agree that the public good is a "good," internal conﬂicts that
lead to franchise extension are possible.
Each individual can choose costly eﬀort to either increase or decrease the public good in the
subsequent period. Let ei ∈ [−b,b] where b is a large enough bound so that interior solutions always
exist. Hence if ei > 0 is chosen by i then this individual augments the investment in the public good,
whereas if ei < 0, then he exerts eﬀort to resist such investments.
Aggregate eﬀort provision is E =
P
i ei, and the size of the public good is multiplicative in this
eﬀort and tax revenue. Beneﬁts from the public good accrue in the following period, so the law of
motion is, as in the previous example,
ω0 =( pY )θE
where Y =
P
i y = ny is the aggregate land in this society. The public good is assumed to fully
depreciate each period. For reasons that will be clear later on, we assume 1/2 >θ>1/4.I fE>0,
then tax revenue is used to produce positive amounts of the public good. If, however, E<0,t h e n
r e v e n u ei su s e dt op r o d u c en e g a t i v ea m o u n t so ft h eg o o d . I ns u c hac a s e ,av o t e rw i t hap o s i t i v e
marginal evaluation, αm > 0, would prefer a tax rate of 0.
Once again, franchise extension may represent a mechanism by which a decision maker can
commit to a certain tax rate, and the relative strength of preferences now determines whether this
is desirable. For example, if aggregate eﬀort is decreasing in the tax rate (opponents of the public
good dissent more strongly than supporters), then it may be possible to commit to a lower tax rate
and thus increase net eﬀort, by delegating the choice of tax policy to an agent with a smaller value
of α.
Suppose, initially that E>0 is forecast. Then an individual’s eﬀort choice, as a function of tax
p,i sg i v e nb yei =
δαi(pY )θ
2c . As expected, this eﬀort is positive iﬀ αi > 0.
As before, all decision rules can be expressed as direct functions of type, αi. It is not hard to











1−2θ is a positive constant. Substituting the policy rule into the eﬀort





where ¯ K = δY θ
2c ¯ Cθ, another positive constant.
Just as in the previous example, types are ordered so that
∂σj
∂αm < 0 whenever
∂σj
∂m > 0. A franchise
extension therefore requires a movement of the median evaluation toward lower, rather than higher,
weights, αm. This means that inequality in Proposition 2 is reversed, using αi as an individual’s








∂ei > (<)0 iﬀ αi > 0( αi < 0). Therefore, diﬀerentiating the behavioral rule
(24) with respect to the state αm, we see that (25) holds iﬀ
P
j6=m αj < 0, or, in other words, P
j αj <α m. This implies that extension occurs only if the median lies above the aggregate welfare
weight for the public good. But since
P
j αj > 0 then this means, among other things, that universal
suﬀrage is not achieved – extension stops when αm =
P
j αj > 0.
A franchise expansion occurs then if the relative transfer from the “positive" group (less that of
the pivotal voter) is outweighed by the relative gain to the “negative" group when taxes are lowered
due to a smaller median weight on the public good. Roughly, the idea is that if the dominant group
extends the franchise to at least some of the outsiders, then the tax burden is lower. Consequently,
the outsiders do not ﬁg h ta sh a r dt or e s i s tt a x a t i o n .I f
P
j αj <α m holds, then, evidently, the drop
in outsider eﬀort outweighs the drop in insider eﬀort.
This "internally driven" explanation appears to be diﬀerent from the "internally driven" expla-
nation underlying the model by Lizzeri and Persico (LP) (2003). LP consider a random voting model
with two groups of citizens. Preferences over policy are uniform within each group, but individuals
diﬀer along an ideological dimension (which correlates with inherent policy-independent support for
one of two political parties). In their model, the equilibrium policy choice reﬂects the relative elec-
toral strengths of ideologically neutral voters in both groups, and is a kind of weighted average of
the most preferred policy of each group. Extending the franchise to members of one of the groups
(but not the other) can have the eﬀect of shifting the equilibrium in the direction of that group’s
most preferred policy.22
There are clear diﬀerences between LP’s set up and ours. Initial members of the elite are, on
average, no diﬀerent to the disenfranchised; policy is determined by party-political competition rather
than median voter preferences; and policy choices and franchise extension are determined by diﬀerent
political processes (while in our model they are both determined by the median voter). However,
there are some more fundamental similarities: in particular, in both models, the economic outcome
of the political process is in general not that which is most preferred by the individual who has the
option of extending the franchise (in both models this is the median voter), and by doing so this
individual can move the outcome in a desirable direction.
In LP, extension eﬀectively strengthens the current median’s voice in the policy decision, but
it comes at a cost of diluting his share of redistributive transfers within the elite. In our model,
22Note that the optimality of such an extension is not automatic, since by expanding the size of the elite, per capita
resources are reduced. However, if initially members of the expanding group were receiving no private transfers, this
dilution eﬀect is absent, and they can be made better oﬀ by the expansion.
24extension has beneﬁcial static eﬃciency eﬀects, but these are traded oﬀ against the costs of loss of
control over future decisions.
Unfortunately, an analytical solution to the equilibrium franchise rule in the present model is not
tractable. However, if the discount factor δ is low, then an approximate solution is given by the one
period Euler equation. Replacing ∞ with T =1in the inﬁnite horizon Euler equation (see Appendix







This solution is consistent with the requirement that
P
j αj ≤ αm.
5.3 External Conﬂict Generates Franchise Extension
Here we recall the "external conﬂict" example in which franchise expansion occurs to head oﬀ the
threat insurrection. Recall that there is a set A of n − J noblemen and a set B of J peasants.
An o b l e m a ni has yi land which generates yi units of potential consumption each period. Only
noblemen can become voters, while peasants are disenfranchised and possess no land.
Each peasant chooses a contribution ej to an uprising which, if successful, leads to the conﬁscation
of the nobility’s aggregate land rents, Y ≡
P
i∈A yi. A nobleman i chooses eﬀort ei to suppress the
revolt. As before, eﬀort is costly to all citizens, and EA =
P
i∈A ei and EB =
P
j∈B ej. Finally,
the state variable, ω, is the probability in the current period that the conﬁscation by the peasants
is unsuccessful. The initial state is ω0 ∈ (0,1). Next period’s conﬁscation likelihood depends on











The negative serial dependence means that a promising but in the end unsuccessful uprising in
the current period reduces the likelihood of successful insurrection in the subsequent period.23 A
successful conﬁscation splits the return Y evenly among the peasants.
Each period, the median enfranchised nobleman chooses a tax rate p which produces revenue pY
with which the peasants can be "bought oﬀ". Redistribution of this tax revenue is both untargeted
and ineﬃcient, in the sense that all citizens (noblemen and peasants) receive the same transfer (as
long as there is no successful insurrection), and the revenue available is (pY )θ,w i t hθ ∈ (0,1).
Members of the nobility have stage game utility functions














23The idea is that "close calls" today lead to better deterrence tomorrow. Conversely, conﬁscation is more likely
when one’s guard is down.
25Using the Euler equations in a ﬁrst order characterization, it can be shown, once again, that

















































for the eﬀorts of noblemen and peasants, respectively.
Using the same techniques as before, it is not hard to show that the franchise is extended by











Using the expressions for eﬀort rules above, it is not hard to show that (26) is equivalent to ym >Y/ n .
Hence, a landowner with endowment ym extends the franchise iﬀ his land value is larger than average.
Despite the stationarity of the equilibrium, its analytical solution is again not tractable. However,
it is instructive to see how the franchise decision aﬀects the trajectory of the state – the likelihood
of insurrection – by changing the private eﬀort of citizens. Figure 3 illustrates the eﬀect of repeated
extensions. The extension eﬀectively lowers the success rate of an insurrection. When authority
is given to a lower income nobleman, the low income nobleman chooses a larger redistributive tax.
This induces a relatively greater eﬀort toward the defense of the status quo compared to the eﬀort
directed toward its demise. The "buy-oﬀ" is therefore successful.
6 Summary
This paper introduces a class of games in which the voter franchise is an explicit voting decision of
the currently enfranchised group. This decision is formulated as a fully recursive delegation decision,
and preferences for enfranchisement options are derived rather than assumed. We know of no other
model with these features.
We characterize equilibria of a related game in which a current dictator may designate a new
dictator whose policy decisions are absolute. We show that under certain conditions, the outcome
path produced by this game may be rationalized by a well deﬁned majority voting rule operating on
a limited voting franchise. This enfranchised group votes for a possibly larger voting franchise in the
next period. The outcome of a vote in any period is shown to coincide with the preferred choice of









Figure 3: Path of insurrection likelihoods with and without a one-time franchise extension
The current median voter is motivated by a desire to change the policy-relevant private decisions
of ordinary citizens. The franchise extension is therefore used as a commitment device to change
private behavior through irreversible expansions of the policy-making elite, which induce credible
changes in future policy choices. This underlying causal mechanism is at the heart of both "internal"
and "external" explanations of observed franchise extensions.
The assumption that political aggregation occurs via a simple majority vote clearly omits some
important subtleties of actual political processes. It also requires restrictive conditions in the present
multi-dimensional policy space. Nevertheless, its use in this context is as good, in our view, as any
alternative. Consider, for example, the inﬂuential citizen-candidate model (see Besley and Coate
(1997) or Osborne and Slivinsky (1996)). While that model can be applied to multi-dimensional pol-
icy spaces, it typically requires burdensome mixed strategies in precisely those cases where majority
voting is problematic. In either model, the fundamental mechanism for institutional change is the
same.
Our framework is shown to cover a variety of policy environments. However, some caveats apply.
The present environment is deterministic and assumes simple, single dimensional policies and private
decisions. Naturally, the framework can be extended to include environments with higher dimensional
policies and private decisions.
The framework can also be extended to stochastic games. The extension to stochastic environ-
ments is important because, it turns out, most existence results either do not apply to deterministic
environments, or apply only when all sets of states, policies, and actions are ﬁnite.24 These issues
a n do t h e r sa r et a k e nu pi nac o m p a n i o np a p e r ,L a g u n o ﬀ (2003).
Future research might be directed toward computational methods for generating equilibria with
franchise extension. It is hoped that a broader comprehension of the dynamic game model of enfran-
24In which case existence of equilibrium is in mixed strategies.
27chisement leads to a deeper understanding of the mechanisms that sustain and extend democracy.
7 Appendix A: Proofs of the Propositions
Proof of Proposition 2 Let Π admit a ﬁrst order characterization. If the current median voter,

















δ∂ Q / ∂ e 0
i
(27)
Substituting these three equations in the franchise Euler equation, (13), if Π admits a franchise
extension then (16) must hold at m0 = m. To obtain the converse, observe that since Π admits a
ﬁrst order characterization then equation (13) is decreasing, and so if (16) holds at m0 = m,t h e nb y
the Envelope Theorem, the solution to (13) entails a choice m0 >m .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 First we show (E-1)-(E-3) are equivalent to the original Euler equations,
(10)-(12). The techniques for showing this are fairly standard. We diﬀerentiate the value function















































δ∂ Q / ∂ e i
(29)
Then, substitute (29) for ∂Vi
∂ω0 in the expression (28) and iterate ∂Vi














































where Λi is deﬁned in the statement of the Proposition.





























Equations (30)-(32) can now be used to obtain the adjusted Euler equations for the pivotal voter’s
policy and franchise decision, and all citizens’ eﬀort decisions, resp. To this end, write the pivotal














Then substitute (32) in place of ∂Vm
∂m00 in (33) to obtain (E-1), the Euler equation for the pivotal
voter’s policy. Next, recall the Euler equation for the franchise decision expressed in terms of its
explicit decomposition of eﬀects, Equation (13). Using Equation (29) to substitute for ∂Vm
∂ω0 and
Equation (32) to substitute for ∂Vm
∂m00 we rewrite Equation (13) to obtain (E-2), the Euler equation for
the franchise decision. Finally, for any ordinary citizen i,w ei t e r a t et h el e f ts i d eo f( E - 2 )o n ep e r i o d
forward. This term should then be substituted in place of ∂Vi
∂m00 in equation (31) to obtain (E-3).
Consequently, a continuously diﬀerentiable, interior proﬁle Π =( σ,µ,ψ) satisﬁes properties I-III
if and only iﬀ these same properties apply to the original Euler equations, (10)-(12). But these are
the conditions for which there exists an equilibrium that admits a ﬁrst order characterization, save
for the Order Restrictedness requirement, (ii). As stated earlier, Property IV is equivalent to the
Order Restrictedness requirement when proﬁles are diﬀerentiable.
8 Appendix B: Equilibrium with Internal Ideological Conﬂict





































































































Recall that since θ>1/4 and
P
i6=m αi < 0,t h e n ∂Vm
∂αm0 is decreasing in αm0, and so the solution
to (34) is a maximizer. The optimal franchise extension is, therefore, the median voter, m0,t h a t
29solves (34). By iterating forward (34), the inﬁnite horizon Euler equation for an initial median voter







































































































where the third equality comes from the fact that
P
i6=m0 αi = Σ−αm0 where we deﬁne Σ ≡
P
j αj.
While this expression does not give tractable analytical solution, we do ﬁnd an approximate solution
when δ is small by ﬁnding the solution to the truncated game when T =1 .25
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